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Abstract. Given that security threats and privacy breaches are com-
monplace today, it is an important problem for one to know whether
their device(s) are in a ”good state of security”, or is there a set of high-
risk vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. In this paper, we address
this simple yet challenging problem. Instead of gaining white-box access
to the device, which offers privacy and other system issues, we rely on
network logs and events collected offline as well as in realtime. Our ap-
proach is to apply analytics and machine learning for network security
analysis as well as analysis of the security of the overall device - apps, the
OS and the data on the device. We propose techniques based on analyt-
ics in order to determine sensitivity of the device, vulnerability rank of
apps and of the device, degree of compromise of apps and of the device,
as well as how to define the state of security of the device based on these
metrics. Such metrics can be used further in machine learning models in
order to predict the users of the device of high risk states, and how to
avoid such risks.
1 Introduction
Network flow data may be categorized as encrypted and unencrypted traffic.
Encrypted traffic allows for transmission specific information such as TCP/IP
headers, session information, and details of the cipher suite being used. Unen-
crypted traffic allows for transmission specific information such as URL tags,
the context, version and name of an application, DUID and UID, location, the
name and type of the device, and details of the operating system being used.
The various network interactions of a device are summarized in Figure 1.
2 Inferences from Network Logs and Events
The problem addressed by this work is presented using the generation of 4 in-
ferences.
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Fig. 1. Summary of network interactions for a network device.
2.1 Inference 1
The first problem is that of inference of details of a network device and the
communication associated with it. These details may be smummarized as follows.
1. The type of device and its associated software versions.
2. The encryption being used in the traffic associated with the device e.g.,
DHCP and URL type (e.g., m.google.com, appstore, and other standard IP
addresses and URLs being used by current iPhone and Android devices).
3. The information embedded in network packets.
4. The location of a device, observable from its IP address (HTTPS) and HTTP
headers.
5. The communication network associated with the device (e.g., services and
IP addresses exracted from TCP/IP header information).
6. The frequency of usage of the device and the duration of each session.
7. The advertisements catered to by the device.
8. The categories of applications that are used on the device (e.g., work, games,
utility, phone, media, social networks, push type, and pull type).
Application specific information may also be identified. This includes the
server addresses used by the application to communicate to a third-party server,
if any. This also includes distribution information such as the application ver-
sion and vendor (may be obtained from application hosting website). Further
details include those of device users: the number of users and their identities.
Miscellaneous details about the application include the advertisement providers
(e.g., Google advertisements) that it communicates wth and the means of com-
munication (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS).
This inference also involves the accumulation of network-based statistics.
These include the statistics of SSL/TLS used and the various security services
used across the network (e.g., communication with Symantec servers). An addi-
tional device type may also be obtained for TPM-bsaed services. The statistics
also include identification of the type of payload used in encrypted traffic.
2.2 Inference 2
This inference focuses on the communication between devices and applications
across the network. The inference involves the generation of user and application
profiles corresponding to network data transactions. It also involves identifica-
tion of the distribution network used by advertisements. These observations can
collectively be used to identify a network map of device vulnerability (e.g., the
potential behavior of a device with respect to malware propogation across the
network, or the observation of botnet components in the network).
2.3 Inference 3
This inference pertains to the compromise of a device and its associated software.
An example may be a focus on identification of rootkits in devices. These may
be identified by observation such as the way in which the device behaves on
the network, the type of operating system and applications installed, the web
addresses that the device communicates to, and a list of potential vulnerabilities.
Hypotheses about an application may be formulated by comparing applica-
tion behavior with signatures of compromised behavior. This may be performed
for identification of applications which are either compromised or exhibit po-
tential of being compromised in the future. This may also identify applications
which are currently not compromised but were compromised in the past.
This information allows for the identification of a security lifecycle associated
with a network device, where a device moves between protected and compro-
mised states. Arcs in such a state diagram may correspond to details about how
the device was cleaned of the compromise e.g., the use of a new installation of the
application. It may additionally encode information about the data transmitted
during the compromised state.
Analysis of this state diagram allows for identification of applications as
malware or re-packaged applications. Such applications exhibit the threat of
leaking confidential or private data, user behavior patterns, and sensory data.
They may also transmit information related to communication channels used by
the device and their associated advertisements and security measures (such as
CAPTCHA). The identification of such threats is useful to avoid the compromise
of host security and to avoid the propagation of malware.
Finally, such information may be used for forensic and security breach analy-
sis. This involves identification of the types of breaches that may have occurred.
This comprises of observation of whether the device is compromised and whether
it exhibits anomalous behavior. This translates to servers with which the device
communicates and their frequency and duration. Analysis may also involve the
observation of an increase in advertisements or the vulnerability of the device.
Note that the potential cost of such security breaches is difficult to estimate
without the availability of whitebox information for the network. Such availabil-
ity includes the knowledge of details about the compromise (e.g., the cause and
duration of the compromise, and the network actions that were executed by the
attacker during that period).
2.4 Inference 4
The final inference to be generated is the energy usage profile of the user. En-
ergy usage allows for a secondary estimate of data transaction by applications
(independent applications and the use of web pages). Note that such inference is
more useful when the operating system or application being used exhibits adap-
tive energy consumption (optimizing for lower energy consumption). Since such
behavior is integrated in most modern-day software, an energy usage profile is
capable of functioning as a secondary source of information on data transactions.
3 Proposed Method
The various uutilities of network flow data are summarized in Figure 2. The
proposed method then is divided into sections based on the different aspects of
analysis of network data.
Fig. 2. Using network flow data.
3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity of a device is defined as the importance of data that the device is
used with. Specifically, this may be defined as the extent of the device data
being personal to the user. The analysis of sensitivity of a device is dependent
on the following factors. Note that the analysis is recusive with respect to the
sensitivity of the components involved.
1. The sensitivity of the data stored, generated and deleted dynamically (e.g.,
personal data, passwords and cookies).
2. The sensitivity of the applications used, and data stored by them. Note that
the sensitivity of an application may depend on its age.
3. The sensitivity of the other devices and web sites that the user connects to,
using this device.
4. The sensitivity of the individuals (other users) that the device is used to
contact (e.g., via phone calls, messaging, calls).
5. The sensitivity of the connections and communications associated with the
device (e.g., frequency, time, and identity).
6. The amount of data transferred.
3.2 Sensitivity Rank
The sensitivity rank of a device implies the risk level and protection level as-
sociated with that device, with respect to sensitivity. Because of the dynamic
data and applications associated with the device, sensitivity rank is a dynamic
value. For example, a wallet is highly sensitive if it contains more currency, credit
cards, personal info, or a combination of these.
Sensitivity rank is computed by building a sensitivity graph. The nodes for
this graph correspond to the entities involves i.e., the devices. The edges for this
graphs correspond to communication from one entity to another. Sensitivity
rank may then be computed as a probabilistic value, similar to PageRank [2].
We therefore define S(x) as the sensitivity rank function for entity x. Similar to
PageRank, we have S(x) ∈ (0, 1).
The following discusses the sensitivity relation between two entities. The
sensitivity rank, S(j) of an entity j that entity i communicates with, contributes
a weighted value to the sensitivity rank S(i) of device i. A weight function
(for an edge connnecting entity i and entity j) is defined such that the weight
function W (i, j) depends on sensitivity related information such as the frequency
of communication, usage, amount of data transferred, how far in the timeline the
communication was carried out, age of apps, authenticated or unauthenticated
connection. W (i, j) therefore represents weight assigned to the relative rank that
entity j contributes to S(i).
A high-level recurrence formulation is then presented in Equation 1.
S(i) =
∑
(W (i, j)S(j)) + S(D(i)) (1)
Where a data function, D(i), is included for increased precision. Specifically,
D(i) represents the data stored at entity i. This includes the data stored across
applications. D(i) is decomposed in Equation 2. HD(i) represents the data gen-
erated by and stored at entity i in the past. CD(i) represents the current data
generated by and stored at entity i.
D(i) = HD(i) + CD(i) (2)
Precise computation of sensitivity rank is also dependent on data sources
other than those which provide TCP/IP information. This may be latent infor-
mation learned from network flow data. Note that many applications are identi-
fiable because they do not use TLS. They may also be identified from from the
advertisements clicked on by the user, or presented as a part of the application.
3.3 Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability of a device is defined as the ease with which a device may be
compromised. The analysis of volnerability of a device is dependent on the fol-
lowing factors. Similar to sensitivuty, the analysis is recusive with respect to the
vulnerability of the components involved.
1. The vulnerability of the applications installed on the device.
2. The vulnerability of the operating system being used by the device.
3. The possibility of vulnerability propagation, i.e. the possibility of a data
transaction path existing between a compromised website and vulnerable
application on the device.
4. The advertisements associated with applications. This includes the sources
of the advertisements and the scripts that they may execute.
5. The information that is transmissed by applications. This comprises of the
following.
– Periodic notifications associated with the application. These include push
notifications.
– The fetching of advertisements and actions associated with clicking on an
adversitement.
– The transmission of sensor-based information. This is significant when
considering the possibility of password cracking by the use of sensor readings.
– The solving of CAPTCHAs [3] associated with the application.
3.4 Vulnerability Rank
Similar to sensitivity rank, the computation of vulnerability rank requires the
construction of a graph. A node (x, V (x)) in the graph represents entity x with
vulnerability V (x), where V (x) is the vulnerability function. An edge from entity
x to entity y exists if entity x is compromised by exploiting the vulnerability V (x)
and vulnerability V (y). The probability of these vulnerabilities being exploited
is reprented by the join probability p((x, V (x)), (y, V (y))) ∈ (0, 1).
The graph is constructed from the known vulnerabilities of different compo-
nents involved e.g., the operating system, applications, vulnerable websites and
services, and advertisements. For an advertisement, the graph may consider how
vulnerable or malicious the advertisement nework is. The vulnerability of an ap-
plication depends on the vulnerability of the advertisements that it receives, the
source of advertisements, and scripts that are executed thereof. An example of
using the graph may be inspection of the existence of a path from a compromised
entity to the user’s device (paths with p > 0. Note that an entity in this graph
may be a device, an application, an advertisement, an operating system, or even
hardware and firmware components.
As in sensitivity rank, vulnerability rank may then be computed as a prob-
abilistic value, similar to PageRank [2]. We therefore define V (x) as the vulner-
ability rank function for entity x. Similar to PageRank, we have V (x) ∈ (0, 1).
The following discusses the vulnerability relation between two entities. The
vulnerability rank V (j) of an entity j that entity i interacts with, contributes
a weighted value to the vulnerability rank V (i) of entity i. The weight function
W (i, j) depends on p(x, y), the frequency of communication, usage of the entity,
the amount of data used, the relative time of occurrence of the communication,
and the age of applications associated with the entities. Note that the weight
value W (i, j) ∈ (0, 1).
A high-level recurrence formulation (for the interaction between entity i and
entity j) is then presented in Equation 3. This formulation includes Denial of
Service (DoS) [1] as a potential threat. Even though an entity may not have any
vulnerability (which is highly improbable), LV (i) does not influence the first
term in Equation 3, that is due to the remote entities that entity i interacts
with.
V (i) =
∑
(W (i, j)V (j)) + IV (i) + LV (i) (3)
Where IV (i) and LV (i) are additional vulnerability functions used for in-
creased precision. IV (i) represents vulnerability due to insiders i.e., the proba-
bility that an insider (authorized user with respect to entity i) would become a
proponent of compromise of entity i. LV (i) represents the local vulnerability of
entity i i.e., the probability that compoenents within entity i can be expoited to
produce a compromise.
3.5 Degree of Compromise
The degree of compromise is a composite metric formulated using sensitivity and
vulnerability. Degree of compromise, DC(i) of a component i, is based on the
following observations in network data.
1. The components and applications specific to a device, that have been com-
promised.
2. The probability p(i) that the device is compromised based on vulnerability
rank V (i) and the network behaviour of the entity i.
3. The criticality of teh compromise of entity i, based on the corresponding
sensitivity rank S(i).
A high-level recurrence formulation is then presented in Equation 4. j is the
component (such as the operating system or application) on the device that has
a vulnerability rank V (j) > 0.
DC(i) = p(i) ∗ S(i) ∗ Sum(DC(j)) (4)
3.6 Security State Analysis
The security state of a device can be determined from network data. The for-
mulation of such state dynamics is useful for applications such as risk analysis,
taking protective actions in case of a compromise of security, and forensic and
security breach analysis. The security state diagram of a device is summarized
in Figure 3. The transitions between different security states over time are sum-
marized in Figure 4. The security state of a network device may be determined
by the following.
1. The observation of anomalous behavior with respect to the device.
2. The access of security services (e.g., Symantec servers) by the device.
3. The strength of the cipher suite associated with the device.
4. The protocol used by the device (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS, SRTP, and RTP).
Fig. 3. Security state diagram for a specific device. The diagram and values associated
with nodes are dynamic with respect to the applications installed in the device and
the network data transactions thereof. The values on nodes represent the degree of
compromise.
Fig. 4. Security state transitions.
3.7 Protection Based on Network Flow Data Analysis
At a given time, the protection level required to prevent the risk can be associated
with the quantification of the risk (involving the computation of S(i), V (i) and
DC(i)). The details of these computations are presented in Section 3.2, Section
3.4 and Section 3.5. This quantity can then be limited to a threshold. Appropriate
actions can then be incorporated across the network. Examples of the different
types of actions that may be executed across the network are enumerated as
follows.
1. Strengthen or weaken access control and authorization policies with respect
to different network components.
2. Restart a network component. The device may then enter a trusted execution
mode, e.g., for financial transactions. This may be required for a network
component i that observes DC(i) > 0. Further, all future data transactions
may be monitored for the given device.
3. Notification of the current security state of a user, and appropriate actions
that may be taken.
4. The enforcement of user behavior policies. For example, a user may not
be allowed to open a sensitive website such as www.chase.com after it has
clicked on an advertisement from low-sensitivity application such as a game
(e.g., AngryBirds).
5. The enforcement of mixed user behavior policies with system-driven control.
6. The enabling or disabliing of applications, features and sensors across the
network based on updated policies.
7. Initiation of backup of device data and the removal of all sensitive data and
applications from the device.
8. The blocking of third-party application synchronization (with other devices)
for vulnerable applications.
9. The lockdown of network communication at various levels of granularities
across the network.
10. Alternative defense mechanisms for the network, in the case where the policy
engine governing the network has been compromised.
11. Disabling a device by draining or removal of all associated energy sources.
This may be enabled by a remote protection unit that sends targeted scripts
via advertisements and web pages to drain energy. For example, if the device
is being used as a bot, and the network infrastructure is beyond control by
local protection.
Risk analysis may also be translated to long-term actions such as the follow-
ing.
1. The identification of requirements for software patches required across dif-
ferent devices and types of patches, and their scheduling. This may be based
on the security state analysis of a device.
2. The engineering of applications and software. This may depend on the pro-
gramming models to be enforced, analysis that is required to be incorporated
with the program (such as sensitivity and vulnerability).
3. The devising of a methodology by which applications and software are re-
qured to support APIs for usage with trusted local and remote services. This
enforeces dynamic protection and the ability of take appropriate defense ac-
tions.
3.8 Forensic Analysis
Forensic analysis of network data involves the use of provenance data collected
by the network. This data comprises of the following.
1. Information about the states of different network components
2. Information about the various ranks (such as sensitivity and vulnerability)
and degrees of different network components.
3. Other latent information that may be inferred from data transmission across
the network.
Such analysis is useful for automated auditing of the behavior of a device,
users and applications that are present in the network. An alert may be issued
by a background process that continuously checks whether the degree of compro-
mise crosses a threshold value. This process may then also identify the following
information.
1. An analysis of any breaches that may have occurred.
2. The methodology that was adopted to compromise a given device.
3. The lack of protections in context of netwrk security that may be incorpo-
rated to avoid such compromise in the future.
Alternatively, forensic analysis may be used to analyze the potential cost of
a security breach. This may be based on the following.
1. The end-points that the device is communicating with at the time of com-
promise.
2. Details about the communication, such as its duration and the frequency of
such communication.
3. Categorizaton of the communication to reflect severity of the potential breach.
Examples of categories of communication include monetary, political, social,
and private.
4 Machine Learning
We develop a Spark-based machine learning stack for implementation of classi-
fication of risk levels of apps and of a device. We plan to develop an SVM-based
system, following which we plan to develop a neural-network based model and
compare their accuracy versus efficiency in predicting risks as well as classifi-
cation of apps in the risk lattice. We plan to apply the risk classification and
risk prediction for multiple devices together that are in a geolocation or in a
network.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we discussed the problem of determining the state of security
of a device – mobile or IoT, using big data analytics and machine learning
on network logs and events of such devices. We further outlined a set of steps
towards remediation of such issues.
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